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Randolph Roth's American Homicide is an impressive achievement,
unmatched in the scale and scope of its account of changes in murder rates over
time. In addition to his own research, Roth has gathered all the extant quantitative
studies of murder in America, a rapidly growing field, into a single database.
When appropriate, he uses foreign scholarship as well to venture into Western
Europe, as far back as the Middle Ages: first, to establish a kind of baseline for
rates on this side of the Atlantic; next, to show the state of homicide in whatever
place successive waves of immigrants originated. This exploration, beginning with
the Puritans, always promotes the comparison, contrasting, and testing of theses.
And while the biggest of these theses, a macro-explanation of the social and
political conditions that tend to make overall rates go up and down, is deeply
unsatisfactory, the book's many virtues outweigh this flaw, however important.
The first of these virtues is the sheer comprehensiveness of Roth's evidence for
who did what to whom, when, how, and above all how often, plus the statistical
ingenuity with which he compiles it. This is an enormous achievement. The key
rates are traditionally expressed in terms of annual homicides per 100,000 persons,
but for much of our history both numerator and denominator are hard to establish.
Since the 1930s, the FBI has published reasonably accurate national figures
derived from individual police departments, but local studies for earlier periods
have struggled with both numerator and denominator. The best figure for
"homicide" is a body count, used here, but when too often this is not available,
scholars have used arrests, imprisonments, or indictments.' Until the U.S. census
began in 1790, and in new or contested parts of what is now the United States, the
denominator, too, is often no better than an educated guess. To further complicate
matters, Roth himself, who is writing a separate book about child murder, prefers,
* Emeritus Professor of History, Haverford College. Full disclosure: I recommended the
manuscript for publication by Harvard University Press, with reservations, a few of them noted
below.
I My own study, ROGER LANE, VIOLENT DEATH IN THE CTY: SUICIDE, ACCIDENT, AND
MURDER IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY PHILADELPHIA (Ohio State Univ. Press 1999) (1979), used
indictments, better sources being unavailable; among other weaknesses, my study cannot show
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although not consistently, to use rates per 100,000 adults over fifteen years of age.
(P. xv.)
Roth has searched harder, deeper, and wider than anyone for past victims of
homicide, although until well into the Twentieth Century geographical coverage
was necessarily a patchwork, dependent on those jurisdictions whose courthouses
or other records have mostly survived fire, flood, neglect, or deliberate destruction.
Most of the earlier quantitative studies, including my own, have concentrated on a
few big cities, generally in the Nineteenth Century. But Roth and others working
with him have managed not only to build on existing research, but to add enough
of their own to present us with painstakingly created pictures of a number of
representative places, ranging from Upper New England (his own specialty)
through thirty-four selected counties in the mountain and plantation South, down
to Florida, up to the rural Midwest, and on to California. The word "painstaking"
is not used lightly: In many of these jurisdictions, in addition to the (relatively)
easy numbers provided by officialdom, Roth has used "every scrap of paper"-
diaries, letters, newspapers, local histories-to hunt for missing cases (p. xi-xii),
using careful statistical techniques both to avoid overlap and to extrapolate missing
numbers in the official series, even eliminating cases that on mature reflection
were officially labeled homicide but seem in fact to have been accident or suicide.
Full appendices on sources and methods, plus directions to the database, allow
readers to crosscheck on their own. (P. xiv-xv.)
But even Roth's unmatched work will not eliminate the "dark figure," as
scholars call the number of offenses that are wholly unknowable.2 While murder is
and was less likely to be ignored than lesser crimes, victims could be hard to find
in wild or underpopulated places, and until well into the Twentieth Century, the
trouble, expense, or embarrassment of a murder investigation could prompt local
authorities to overlook or mislabel dubious cases.3 There is reason to be skeptical
of the figures Roth advances for black-on-black, as well as white-on-black, killings
in the South. (Pp. 99-101, 411-14, passim.) Slaves, with no recourse to the
formal justice system, often had to settle their quarrels physically. Even after the
elimination of slavery, white officials could be indifferent, at best, to black victims,
and during the antebellum years owners had economic incentive to cover up
killings among their bondsmen-better not to hang the guilty party, which would
leave little or no compensation for the loss, but rather to sell him "down the river,"
to raw new lowland plantations, itself often a death sentence.
In fact, one of Roth's major contributions is to call attention to some of the
conditions in which accuracy is wholly impossible. One simple reason why earlier
2 See, e.g., Richard A. Leo & Jon B. Gould, Studying Wrongful Convictions: Learning from
Social Science, 7 01mo ST. J. CR. L. 7,29 (2009).
During five selected years in Nineteenth-Century Philadelphia, which yielded eighty-two
murder indictments, there were ninety-two other incidents that the newspapers labeled suspicious, not
counting patrons with skull fractures found to have "accidentally fallen" outside of saloons, or the
scores, perhaps hundreds, of annual infant deaths that would today demand investigation. LANE,
supra note 1, at 89-90.
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quantitative studies of homicide have largely concentrated on the bigger cities of
the Nineteenth Century is that these had relatively stable justice systems, and the
kind of bureaucratic record-keeping that enables longitudinal histories over many
decades.4 But especially today, when the public associates violence with inner
cities, the records of Nineteenth Century Philadelphia, Chicago, or New York
leave a misleading impression about how murderous our history has been, their
rates belonging at the least on the same scale as the current national average, which
is close to six per 100,000 persons. In the past, rural places have usually been the
most violent, especially when different races, nations, parties, and even individuals
contested for land and supremacy. Roth reminds us of how many wars we have
fought on what is now our own soil, and that quite apart from the official
combatants, the cycle of provocation, violence, plunder, and revenge often
preceded and outlasted their formal duration. (P. 37.) And so Roth estimates that
for much of the founding Seventeenth Century, as French, Natives, Dutch, and
English jostled each with and without official declarations, peacetime homicide
rates could reach an astonishing 100 or even 500 per 100,000 adults. (P. 46.) Late
in the following century, in parts of the new republic established by the American
Revolution, the 1783 Treaty of Paris only settled the issues on paper. In the
southern backcountry, unrepentant Tories and Patriots, Natives, and land grabbers
battled each other through the 1790s and into the early 1800s, with murder rates
"probably" reaching 200 or more. (P. 162.) A few decades later, in what is now
the American Southwest, before the War with Mexico, tensions among Anglos,
Hispanics, and Natives from Texas to California pushed their combined homicide
rates "probably" above 100, and afterwards up to 250. (Pp. 234, 354.) Back east,
rates soared, too, before the Civil War, a development Roth attributes mainly to
political tension. During the war itself, in the southern Appalachians, where the
Confederate government was weak, his 100-200 estimate for North Georgia, was
dwarfed by an epic "at least" 600 on the upper Cumberland, along the Kentucky-
Tennessee border. (P. 336.) Southern Reconstruction, after the war, was notorious
for the violence used by defeated whites to restore or maintain racial dominance,
while out on the plains, much of the fabled gunplay of Hollywood's Wild West
involved bitter ex-confederate outlaws confronting one-time union soldiers such as
Bill Hickok and Wyatt Earp. (Pp. 382-83.)
At least as interesting as rates at the macro level is what Roth does at the
micro, after establishing categories in terms both of apparent motive and
relationship between killer and victim. Many observers have shown that almost
always and everywhere homicide is a "guy thing," as perhaps excepting
4 Among fine urban studies are: JEFFREY S. ADLER, FIRST IN VIOLENCE, DEEPEST IN DIRT:
HOMICIDE IN CHICAGO, 1875-1920 (2006); CLARE V. MCKANNA, JR., HOMICIDE, RACE, AND JUSTICE
IN THE AMERICAN WEST, 1880-1920 (1997); ERIC H. MONKKONEN, MURDER IN NEW YORK CITY
(200 1); KEVIN J. MULLEN, DANGEROUS STRANGERS: MINORITY NEWCOMERS AND CRIMINAL VIOLENCE
IN THE URBAN WEST, 1850-2000 (2005); and DENNIS C. RoUSEY, POLICING THE SOUTHERN CITY: NEW
ORLEANS, 1805-1889 (1996). The late Eric Monkkonen also compiled in 2005 a complete computer
file in Los Angeles homicides, 1830-2001, which Roth has incorporated into his database.
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neonaticide, men account for roughly 90% of perpetrators and 80% of victims.
Roth, too, finds that most incidents resulted from fights involving male honor,
usually among acquaintances, whether cards, words, or women furnished the
proximate cause; property disputes, robbery, and sexual aggression round out the
usual suspects. (P. 16.) And although far rarer than the killing of unrelated adults,
homicide also occurred among relatives. (P. 138.) With a little extra dose of
murder over property and inheritance among fathers and sons, or uncles and
nephews, deadly quarrels among male relatives, whether blood, step, or in-law,
were much like those among men in general (although sibling rivals for status or
dominance were presumably less inclined to question each others' paternity, or
their mothers' sexual preferences). But spousal killings, and those between real or
hoped-for intimate partners, were another matter entirely. In general, Roth argues,
the incidence of these killings went up or down for reasons independent of those
that changed overall rates, and in tracing these over time he provides his readers
with an often fascinating history of marriage and courtship. (Pp. 108-09, 251-52.)
During the colonial period, slaves outside of New England could not legally
marry, and the records everywhere are too scarce and murky to allow much
generalization. But, while observers were often shocked by both the casual nature
and the violence of marriage among Native Americans, whose rates of both marital
and "intimate" homicide were perhaps fifteen to twenty times the white average (p.
108), spousal abuse was endemic in their own communities. In its usual form, a
husband's "correction" (beating) of a wife thought blameworthy was both socially
and legally acceptable. (P. 110.) Still, despite the timeless quarrels over fidelity,
drinking, children, money, and work, the death rate was then minimal, a generally
accidental by-product of actions intended to punish rather than kill, for reasons
based on the nature of contemporary marriage itself. (Pp. 251-52.)
During the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, Roth argues, spousal
homicide was low across the whole of the Anglo-American world because of the
economic, and to a lesser degree social, importance of family ties. (P. 109.) New
Englanders, especially, wed as mature adults who knew what they were getting
into, and although their unions were freely entered, not arranged by their parents,
the emotional temper of their expectations was low. (Pp. 111-12.) Marriage was
conceived as a contract, not least economically, and while the division of labor was
clearly gendered, both partners, and often the wider network provided by their
conjoined families, were essential to proper running of farm or shop. (P. 109.)
Cruelty in itself was no ground for divorce, but abuse was generally kept within
accepted bounds partly through intervention by family and partly, again especially
in New England, by the wider community. (P. 120.) In the whole period up to
1800, only thirty-five spousal homicides appear, a rate "probably two or three
times" as low as that in Mother England, in part because the hardships of the New
World "seem" to have promoted even greater mutual dependence. (P. 109.)
"Romance" killings between lovers, meanwhile, were as rare as romance itself. (P.
132.)
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All of these conditions changed as the Eighteenth Century gave way to the
Nineteenth. One of the factors that pushed up the murder rate among intimates
was an increasing stress on love as the basis for marriage, and on the rights of
women. (P. 281.) While other scholars have suggested these links, American
Homicide extends and deepens them, providing nuanced and sometimes surprising
insights. Cultural historians have measured the onset of the Romantic Era through,
for example, the growing proportion of magazine stories and articles that stressed
sentimental emotion as basis for attachment, the percentage growing from less than
20% between 1741 and 1794 to nearly 60% between 1795 and 1825. (Pp. 135 &
526 n.65.) And with a little lag, Roth adds his own quantitative measure, as
beginning in the late 1820s murders of lovers or spouses, although still a small
proportion of the total number of homicides, began to spurt upwards. In New
Hampshire and Vermont, the number of homicides increased by a factor of five.
(P. 250.)
Although the number of cases he can analyze in detail is limited, it is big
enough to let Roth distinguish a variety of patterns that differ in often fascinating
ways: not only romantic-versus-spousal murders, but several types of the latter, as
they changed over time, among Northerners and Southerners, blacks and whites,
Hispanics and Chinese, Catholic Irish and native-born Protestants, together with
references to several European nations.
Romance murders were most common among educated urban Protestants in
the North, the ones most sensitive to a changing cultural context. (P. 252.) Once
imbued with the notion that there would be a unique "one and only," would-be
suitors found rejection intolerable. (P. 252.) And although fully aware that they
could never get away with it-and in fact two-thirds of them in the North and
Midwest committed suicide after the fact (p. 285)-they felt the need to kill the
object of their obsessions. (P. 250.) A typically interesting side note is that once
widely available, beginning in the 1840s, pistols were the overwhelming weapon
of choice, apparently because the killers did not want to disfigure the beauty of
their victims as with axe, knife or blunt instrument. (P. 252.) The relatively rare
women (often prostitutes), on the other hand, who murdered or tried to murder
men who had passed them over, tended to be less respectable than their male
counterparts, and reacted not with suicidal melancholia but with fury; one has the
feeling they might have used chain saws had they been invented. (P. 288.)
Husbands who killed wives, too, were generally lower on the social scale than
romantic males, and reacting to somewhat different kinds of social change. (Pp.
256-57.) By the middle of the Nineteenth Century opportunities in mills, shops or
schools gave women economic opportunities that they had earlier lacked, and both
popular culture and the law increasingly turned against the notion of absolute
patriarchical authority. At the same time, again especially among northern
Protestants, there was a surge in religious enthusiasm which coupled with the
temperance movement to raise the standards of wifely expectations; men were
expected not merely to support their families but to behave respectably, feel and
display sentimental emotion, and not least to limit their drinking. (Pp. 262 & 546
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n.19.) Alcohol or other drugs have always figured in the majority of homicides,
and husbands, feeling hemmed in by these new standards, sometimes struck back
in murderous rage. Unlike the colonial patriarch who killed accidentally, as a
beating got out of hand, such a man was defiantly unapologetic, having given the
damn woman exactly what she deserved. (P. 256.)
Again and again, especially for the Colonial and early national periods, and in
northern New England and the rural Midwest, the times and places where Roth has
done the most original research, American Homicide is full of material that is new
even to scholars in the field, with insights that range from the suggestive to the
convincing, and small historical vignettes illustrated by representative cases.
But it ends with an anti-climax. The final chronological chapter, covering the
near-century from World War I to the present, runs fewer than forty pages out of a
655-page book. The reason given is curious: The official data, which become fully
available at state and national levels only for this period, "cannot be used to
determine rates for specific kinds of homicides, like marital or robbery murders, or
rates for specific demographic groups." (P. 435.) In the first place, this is simply
not true of the FBI's annually published Crime in the United States, dating from
the 1930s, which has provided increasingly detailed breakdowns by category.
Recent editions allow for extraordinarily complex analyses, reporting killings
listed by the age, sex, and race of both victims and offenders, the relationship
among them when known, the weapons used and apparent motive, and those
killings committed in the course of other felonies (including robbery, rape,
burglary, and many other offenses). As an example, for 2008, the line for "Child
Murdered by Babysitter" counts fifty-one victims in 2008-forty-one of the killers
are listed as acquaintances, five family, two friends, and three of unknown
relationship.5 In the second place, except for trial transcripts, the official data Roth
uses do not yield detailed information in themselves: he, as others before him,
must work to get it, using newspapers and other sources far more available for the
Twentieth Century than for earlier periods. And there is no reason why sample
jurisdictions cannot be mined in the same way that he uses, for example, Ross
County and Holmes County in Ohio, from 1798-1900. (P. 163 and passim.)
Perhaps a better explanation for why Roth slights recent experience is that it poses
obvious challenges to his overall thesis, or theses, the most disappointing aspect of
his book.
Although it has little to say about either the changing legal context of
homicide or of popular attitudes towards it, American Homicide is rich in political
and economic data. Both are central, Roth claims, to the four conditions whose
presence raises, or absence lowers, the homicide rate, anywhere or anytime. (P.
18.) The first three conditions are closely related; indeed the first two virtually
indistinguishable. They are: (1) a belief that government is stable, its institutions
5 FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, Crime in the United States, 2008:
Murder Circumstances by Relationship (Sept. 2009), http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2008/
offenses/expanded information/data/shrtable_10.html.
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both unbiased and strong enough to protect life and property; (2) trust in
government and its officials; and (3) patriotism, empathy, and fellow feeling
arising from racial, religious, or political solidarity. The fourth condition-a
belief in the legitimacy of the social hierarchy (which he defines largely in
economic terms), and that one's social position is or can be satisfactory to oneself
and respected by others without resort to violence-is a little different, but this
condition clearly overlaps belief/trust in government, as part of and guarantor of
"social hierarchy." (Pp. 17-18.) But, more significantly, all of the conditions
Roth lists are questionable, especially to those seeking guidance or expertise about
our current situation or recent history. At one extreme, they are too obvious to be
of much use; at the other end, they present enormous problems of definition and
evidence. Although Roth claims universal validity for all four, occasionally citing
evidence from other countries, I will not speculate, say, about what, by his indices,
must have been astronomical rates among Russian Jews under the Czars; rather, I
will confine my critique to American History.
The "obvious" charge certainly applies to those times and places (as
examples: the early Seventeenth Century, the mid-Nineteenth Century Southwest,
and parts of the South in the era surrounding the Civil War) where government was
so minimal or contested by antagonistic groups that law and order broke down,
grossly violating conditions (1) and (2), and leading to off-the-chart rates of
homicide. The problems of definition and evidence, in contrast, apply to the whole
of our history, and the entire book.
With establishment of a new nation in 1789, Roth attempts to measure
conditions (1), (2), and to a lesser extent (3), usually with reference to attitudes
towards the federal government. (Pp. 20-21.) Before the Gallup Poll, first
published in 1935, his estimates are based on such ingenious indices as the number
of new counties named after national heroes during a given period, or on standard
political history, positing low trust, for example, during the stormy decade
preceding the Civil War. (P. 306.) And although he finds them basically
irrelevant to homicide rates among intimates, as described above, he insists,
repeatedly, that attitudes towards the federal government affected the far larger
category of rates among unrelated adults. Although "[m]ost of these murderers
were unaware that their behavior had any connection with political conflict," Roth
manages to make the connection, whether the apparent or proximate cause was a
robbery, rape, or barroom brawl. (P. 312.) Problems abound.
In the first place, murderers were typically poor or marginal males, often
illiterate or ill-informed, and, yes, perhaps alienated. But given the remoteness,
and the limited role, of the national government during most of our history, to the
degree that such men may have been hostile to or even aware of government, it
was surely the county courts, or perhaps the state, that inspired their sullen
resentment. Roth pays little attention to state government, except in the post-
bellum South, and none whatsoever to the counties. It strains credulity to imagine
that tariff policy, say, was on the minds of the participants in the typical saloon
fight. The problem of information is especially acute as applied to slaves, even
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apart from the perhaps questionable figures regarding black homicides, as
suggested above. These were people deliberately isolated from news outside the
plantation, yet Roth attributes variations in their intra-racial murder rates in the
decades after the American Revolution to hopes (killings down) and
disappointments (killings up), regarding the always faint possibility of
emancipation through federal action. (Pp. 177, 182.)
Again with blacks as one among several possible examples, American
Homicide offers different and even opposite explanations for the same kind of
trend. Thus, in the South during the 1890s and early 1900s, a rising homicide rate
among African Americans is attributed to the "hopelessness and rage" caused by
white political oppression. (P. 434.) Three generations later, it was the lifting of
that oppression, through passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1865, that supposedly
"made the inequality that remained all the more intolerable," leading to another
rise in violence. (P. 456.)
The very diversity of the American population, of which Roth continually and
rightly reminds us, further undermines his theses. That is, different and often
hostile groups may have diametrically opposite views of government, at different
levels, making it hard to establish an overall index for the nation as a whole. As an
example, white southerners after the Civil War were generally opposed to federal
policy, their attitudes towards state and county differing from place to place,
depending on who was in charge. (Pp. 386-87.) The only possible generalization
is that their politics were typically the mirror image of those of the local blacks.
A parallel problem dogs condition (3): "fellow feeling" seems hard to
establish across group lines, and Roth makes it clear that it is strongest when the
group is threatened by, or in conflict with, others. He writes: "Nothing depresses
homicide rates more effectively than a race war (for the winning side, at least)."
(P. 469.) After King Phillip's War in colonial Massachusetts, the best and perhaps
only other full-blown example is the Mexican War, officially 1846-48, but in
effect lasting much longer as Anglos, Hispanics, and Native Americans continued
to battle over land and'power. (P. 357.) In California, rather unusually, more than
half of all mid-Nineteenth Century homicides occurred across racial lines. (Pp.
369-70.) Yet despite constant threats from the outside, "[t]here was little
solidarity within any racial group," as intra-racial rates were also high. (P. 370.)
The same was true a little later in Arizona, where an "us-versus-them mentality"
did nothing to prevent soaring intra-group killings. (P. 404.) And the Nineteenth
Century Southwest is hardly unique: In what seems a direct contradiction of his
own thesis, Roth notes, oddly, that all across the country Anglos killed each other,
and still do, "[w]herever they held narrower majorities and were less firmly in
control." (Pp. 407-08, 445.)
The last proposition, that belief in the legitimacy of the social hierarchy is a
factor tending towards homicidal behavior, is more promising. (P. 469.) In
practice, Roth infers its rises and falls from the ease or difficulty of an individual's
ability to move up economically, or at least to find a secure and respected place
among the rungs of the fabled American Ladder of Success. This is a more
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sophisticated variant of the old, too simple, and often discredited notion that
poverty, or bad times, are in themselves root causes of violence. Roth is
convincing when he points out that in the increasingly violent 1830s, 40s, and 50s,
although incomes were generally rising, it was growing harder for wage earners to
achieve independent ownership of shops, farms, or businesses, long the American
ideal, thus contributing to widespread alienation. (P. 261.) And later in the
Nineteenth Century, although the hope of ownership was still in retreat, homicide
rates generally declined somewhat, the result of more favorable attitudes towards
wage labor, as terms of self-esteem such as hard work and respectability became
functional substitutes for economic independence. (Pp. 390 & 575 n. 10.)
The key period in the rise of American homicide rates, all observers have
found, was indeed the 1840s and 50s, when the United States, which had had
among the lowest murder rates in the western world, suddenly emerged as number
one in that respect, and has stayed there ever since. (P. 180.) This unfortunate pre-
eminence, in keeping with Roth's stress on the primacy of political attitudes, is
attributed to the alleged fact that our country is "the only major Western country
that failed at nation-building," a proposition that would astonish many historians
on both sides of the water. (P. 384.) Indeed, he avers that "national feeling and
the empathy, trust, and goodwill that flow from it," have never recovered from the
Civil War, "except for a brief period during World War II and the Cold War." (P.
386.)
One ill-effect of this insistence on his own theses is that Roth systematically
slights the conventional wisdom, always of course a legitimate target, but often the
best explanation available. With respect to the 1840s and 50s, for example, prior
historians,6 while noting political tensions, have stressed two other factors,
especially in fast growing preindustrial cities. One is Samuel Colt's invention of
the pocket revolver: small, cheap, easily hidden on the person, with the potential to
turn any drunken shoving match into an instant fatality. (P. 252.) The other,
compounding factor, is the arrival of hundreds of thousands of desperate Irish
refugees from famine (my people), with a long history of drunken recreational
violence. (P. 84.) With factories still located out by rural waterfalls, there was
little market for unskilled urban labor, and many immigrants joined violent street
gangs that delighted in their newfound firepower, helping make this the heyday of
urban riot. While Roth places some blame on the Irish, he still claims that North-
South political tension was the key, while handguns, the most obvious suspects in
the differing paths taken by America and Europe then (and later), are treated as
merely incidental-"as much a response to the rise in homicide rates as a cause."
(Pp. 315 & 560 n.35.)
On the other side of the Civil War, as rates moved down in the North, other
historians have pointed to an expanded police, and more importantly the new jobs
opened by factory and bureaucracy, which complemented a growing school system
6 ROGER LANE, MURDER IN AMERICA: A HISTORY (1997) summarizes my own and others'
work on this period in Chapter 4, especially pages 109-11.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW
in regimenting new generations, demanding that they sober up, cooperate, and
sublimate their aggressive impulses-developments further aided by the
proliferation of ball-clubs, prize fighting, amusement parks, and other means of
absorbing young male energies. American Homicide explicitly denies these
suggestions when not ignoring them, but does credit the fact that the Wild Irish
"were gradually assimilated into society" by the 1880s and 90s, nine-tenths of
them having moved out of unskilled labor, with their murder rates down
dramatically. (Pp. 389-91.) He does not explain how this happened, but it was
surely not a matter of national politics; as a group, Irish Catholics remained
Democrats in an era of Republican ascendancy. (P. 198.) Perhaps parochial and
public schooling, factories, and bureaucracy contributed after all, together with
skating rinks, ice cream parlors, and the likes of John L. Sullivan and John
McGraw as exemplars of disciplined rather than uncontrolled aggression.
For most readers, more familiar with the late Twentieth and early Twenty-
First Centuries than with earlier times, the weaknesses of American Homicide will
be most apparent towards the end of the last and least of its chronological chapters.
Here, as elsewhere, the privileging of political attitudes as central explanation for
changing levels of homicide leads Roth either to downplay other explanations or to
offer debatable interpretations of political history itself. Thus a rise in urban
homicides during the 1920s is attributed to a number of factors (pp. 461 & 586
n.51), not including national prohibition (the name Al Capone is notably absent);
nor does Roth mention such technical aids as the explosion in automobile traffic,
which in the form of getaway cars greatly enhanced robbery-murders, especially in
combination with Tommy guns. Rates fell during Roosevelt's New Deal, arguably
a time, despite much controversy, of relative consensus about the effectiveness of
national policy. (Pp. 450-51.) And for much of the period between World War II
and the end of the Cold War, normal rates settled into the single digits, low by
historic standards-perhaps the result, as Roth has it, of the patriotism and fellow
feeling generated by these external threats. (P. 448.) Double-digit homicide rates
were, however, occasionally reached, according to the Bureau of Vital Statistics, as
in 1973-74 (Nixon), and 1979-82 (Carter and Early Reagan). (Pp. 462-64.)
Following a drop, then another surge in the late 1980s, the modem record was set
in 1991-92, which did indeed correlate with the end of the Cold War.' (Pp. 464-
66.) Many observers, however, credit both this final surge and peak to the fad for
crack cocaine, a drug doubly dangerous: its pharmacological effect on the
aggressive impulse is worse than alcohol (the traditional villain) and its ease of
distribution makes for continual contests on inner-city street corners-worse,
again, than alcohol under National Prohibition. In the chapter, Roth devotes less
Id. at 181-88 (summarizing my and others' work on this period for the later Nineteenth
Century).
f For figures from the Bureau of Vital Statistics, see id. at 308. These are slightly higher
figures than those found in the FBI's annual Crime in the United States publication for reasons of
definition, thus further complicating the compilation of accurate homicide statistics.
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than a single sentence to crack, instead citing disenchantment with the political
revolution led by President Ronald Reagan. (P. 466.) Despite this alleged
disenchantment, however, Reagan was successfully able to pass the office on to his
Vice-President, George H.W. Bush, whose own term was never more popular than
during the First Gulf War of 1990-91-that is, just at the peak for homicide rates.
(P. 466.)
The thesis grows even more untenable during the past twenty years. Rates
dropped rapidly down into the range of five to six annual homicides per 100,000
persons early in the 1990s, and have stayed there since. No one has satisfactorily
explained just why this is so, although surely the ebbing of the crack epidemic had
something to do with it, as even young inner-city dealers were likely appalled by
the wasted, drooling addicts they had helped to create. But, just as surely, neither
the fall nor the relatively low flat-line since can be explained in terms of favorable
attitudes towards the national government. Bill Clinton, elected by a minority of
voters, was impeached by the Congress of the United States, the only President in
over a century to achieve either of these negative distinctions. George W. Bush,
his successor, was also elected by a minority of voters, under far more
controversial conditions. And if the attacks of September 11, 2001, should have
united Americans in patriotism and fellow feeling, the effect was notably un-
reflected in homicide rates, and remarkably short-lived. Even Bush's few
remaining partisans would not claim that his time in office, which sparked a
partisan bitterness unseen for generations, was distinguished by trust in the
legitimacy or effectiveness of the federal government.
Finally, it is Roth's misfortune to have finished his chronological narrative in
2006, although he added a few hopeful words two years later: "It is . .. a good sign
that most of the leading candidates in the American elections of 2008 recognized
that divisive rhetoric is capable of inciting violence and deliberately stepped back
from the worst excesses of partisanship." (P. 474.)9 During 2009, a year marked
by truly unprecedented political anger and mistrust, compounded by the second-
worst depression in our history, when not only faith in government but in the
American ladder of opportunity surely reached lows not seen in generations, the
FBI's Uniform Crime Reports tell us that the national murder rate, having dropped
by 1.7% and 4.2% during the last two, especially unpopular years of the Bush
Presidency, plunged a truly astonishing 7.1% during the first year of Barack
Obama's.' 0 Roth could not have foreseen this; few of us did. But few of us have
offered such sweeping explanations for the rises and falls of homicide rates.
9 Roth's "most of' construction presumably is meant to exclude Sarah Palin.
10 FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, Crime in the United States, 2007: Crime Trends by
Population Group (Sept. 2008), http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2007/data/table12.html; FED. BUREAU
or INVESTIGATION, Crime in the United States, 2008: Crime Trends by Population Group (Sept.
2009), http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2008/data/table12.html; FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, Crime
in the United States, 2009: Crime Trends by Population Group (Sept. 2010),
http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2009/data/table_12.html.
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This review will not end on so down a note. American Homicide remains a
remarkable achievement. The failure of its overall thesis should not obscure the
rest of its contributions. And if the thesis is a failure, it is a noble failure, the result
of an attempt far more ambitious than any American has ever dared. This is, after
all, an effort to advance general rules for the direction and incidence of homicide
not only for this country but for the Western World in general, beginning well
before the settlement of British North America.
My own synthesis of original data and others' scholarship did no more than to
try to explain why our murder rates have been higher historically than those of
most advanced nations, finding slavery at the root of that touchiness about personal
respect or male "honor," which has led us into an often deadly tendency both to
fight on slight provocation and to tolerate (even honor) those who do. Like most
in the field, I tried no more than, at best, to interpret the fluctuations of a single
jurisdiction, and/or for a few decades of our national history, using multiple
explanations as seemed appropriate for the specific venue and period under
study."
This grudging acceptance that much about murder remains mysterious
contrasts strongly with Roth's single set of keys to why rates have gone up and
down in different times and places. Some European historians, indeed, have
followed Norbert Elias, writing back in the 1930s, who professed to see a continual
process of "civilization," which with inevitable zigs and zags has broadly pushed
down murder rates from the Twelfth Century down to modern times.12 Roth,
taking careful account of improvements in medical care-which in the Twentieth
Century tended to pull significant number of cases back from death, thus
transforming homicides into assaults-quietly destroys this rival thesis, showing
modern rates as high as those of the Middle Ages. (P. 12.)
And readers may find in his figures a reminder that our homicide problem,
however fearsome it seems to us now, has generally flattened out since the late
Nineteenth Century at rates far smaller than in the past; as a single example, the
largely white Mountain South of the 1870s was perhaps ten times more murderous
than today's cities, such as Oakland, Chicago, or New Orleans, which are filled
with desperate minority populations. And if, finally, we are more violent than our
peers and rivals in Western Europe and the Far East, we still average fewer than
the planetary average as of late in the Twentieth Century: 6.9 homicides
domestically versus 8.8 homicides globally per 100,000 persons annually, even
" See generally LANE, supra note 1; LANE, supra note 6.
12 The first English translation of Elias's work was made decades after its original German
publication in 1939. See NORBERT ELIAS, POWER & CIVILITY: THE CIVILIZING PROCESS: VOLUME II
(Edmund Jephcott trans., 1982). His thesis has most recently been taken up by PIETER SPIERENBURG,
A HISTORY OF MURDER: PERSONAL VIOLENCE IN EUROPE FROM THE MIDDLE AGES TO THE PRESENT
(2008).
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according to the perhaps suspect estimates supplied by the World Health
Organization. (P. 7.)
Historical perspective is no small gift.

